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VITIATION OF THE USE TAX:
IT PAYS TO ADVERTISE
IN THE MID-1930's, various pressures compelled the recognition and
utilization of the sales tax as a valuable source of revenue.1 Conse-
quently, it became necessary to protect the tax from various channels
of evasion, the most significant of which was the loss due to out-of-state
purchases, since such transactions were immune from sales tax under
a settled rule of constitutional law.2 A separate tax imposed on the
ase3 of personal property within the taxing state was conceived as
the ideal device for reaching goods purchased out-of-state4 and brought
into the state for use.'
1 See CRIz, THE USE TAx 1 (194).
' The rule was that states were impliedly prohibited by the Commerce Clause from
taxing interstate sales. Brown v. Maryland, iz Wheat. 4i9 (U.S. 18z7). However,
the scope of this prohibition was substantially limited when the Supreme Court, in i94o,
held that the local delivery in an interstate sale of goods was sufficient local activity
to sustain a sales tax by the buyer's state. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining
Co., 309 U.S. 33 (194o) 5 see Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes, 53 HARV. 1".
REV. 909 (1940).
'As is indicated by its title, the use tax is a levy on the use or enjoyment of that
which is purchased, while a sales tax is a tax on the freedom of purchase. McLeod v.
J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944). [Curiously, the Supreme Court in a
case decided the same day as the Dilworth case, referred to the two taxes as being the
same in substance and the same in their effect on interstate commerce. International
Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 347 (1944.).] Further, the
use tax is an ad valorern tax-the value of the property used, stored, or consumed being
determinative as to tax liability; and it is non-recurring-the taxing state levying only
once on a given piece of property, in contrast to annual license or property taxes. For
a thorough discussion of the tax from an economist's point of view, see CRZ, supra
note i.
'Theoretically, the use tax is not restricted in its scope to personal property pur-
chased outside the taxing state. Rather, all personal property used, stored, or consumed
within the taxing state is subject to the tax. However, all the use tax statutes exempt
commodities on which a sales tax has already been paid, restricting the use tax, in
practice, to out-of-state purchases. But the absence of this exemption would give vent
to the inherent scope of the tax, which includes all commodities used within a state
irrespective of the state of purchase. CRIZ, supra note t, at 3.
' It has been contended that the protection of sales tax revenues is not, in itself,
sufficient to justify the use tax. The thought is that "the amount of diversion due to the
sales tax is quite small and the corresponding loss of revenue negligible." Carlson,
Interstate Barrier Effects of the Use Tax, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 2z3, 224 (194-1).
Because of this inherent weakness of the "revenue protection" theory, the justification
for the use tax most generally advanced is that it furnishes protection to local mer-
chants. In particular, local retailers of large items are benefited by the use tax, since the
sales tax on such items is sufficiently large to induce purchasers to incur the incon-
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Unfortunately, there is implicit in the nature of the use tax a pro-
nounced problem of collection.0 The source of the difficulty is appar-
ent. It is virtually impossible to impose a workable check upon the nu-
merous out-of-state purchases which may be made by individuals in the
course of a year. While such. a check might conceivably succeed as
applied to items of large size or those for the possession of which a
registration is required, it would unquestionably fail as applied to small
day-to-day purchases of consumable goods.7 The only workable solution
would seem to be a procedure similar to that used under the sales tax-
to collect the tax from the out-of-state retailer, leaving him to reim-
burse himself from the consumer.8 This, in fact, has been the procedure
adopted by use tax agencies whenever possible.
venience of out-of-state shopping in an attempt to avoid the tax. However, in the light
of the Bemind-White decision, note z supra, it has been suggested that the use tax
is no longer necessary. Brown, Fature of Use Taxes, 8 LAw & CONTEMP, PROD. 495,
504 (1941). At the other extreme, however, is the thought that since the scope of the
use tax is broader than that of the sales tax, the latter should be abandoned and tile
use tax imposed in its place. Powell, supra note 2, at 930.
' Other problems have been overcome. The constitutionality of the use tax was
settled in 1937 in a case arising from the objection of a Washington construction com-
pany to paying the tax on goods purchased out of state. The tax was assailed as a
direct burden on interstate commerce and as a protective tariff. The Supreme Court,
however, upheld the tax as a levy on the local incident of use after shipment in com-
merce and unrelated to the act of importation. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300
U.s. 577 0937),
Also settled is the invalidity of a use tax on articles being used, when taxed, in
interstate commerce, such as the fuel used to propel a boat travelling between two
states. Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, (1929). However, the prin-
ciple of the Helson case was not extended to articles merely destined for use its inter-
state commerce. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the storage of property
within a state is a taxable event, notwithstanding the pendency of consumption in inter-
state commerce. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933); Edelman
v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc., 289 U.S. 249 (1933). Eventually, the Supreme Court
reduced the break in interstate movement necessary to sustain a use tax to the brief
pause between the delivery of articles to their destination and the completion of in-
stallations necessary for their use in interstate commerce. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182 (1939); Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167
(1939).
' Having recognized the impracticability of collecting the tax on the use of such
items, many states have exempted them from tax liability, thereby removing the ordinary
small purchaser from the category of tax evader. See, e.g., Micii. Comp. LAWS
§ 20o5 . 9 4(k) (1948).
" In the light of such a reimbursement plan, the incidence of both use and sales
taxes has been categorically assumed to fall on the consumer. But there is abundant
economic authority contradicting the inevitability of such a shift. See Warren &
Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays Its Way, 38 COLUM. L. REv.
49, 71 (1938)- It has even been suggested that a notoriously non-shifted sales tax
(i.e., seller pays tax without being reimbursed) might invalidate a shifted use tax
The availability of the out-of-state retailer as a collection agent,
however, has been seriously restricted by the recent case of Miller Bros.
v. Maryland. There, the defendant, a Delaware retaileri having been
directed by the state of Maryland to collect its use tax' ° on sales made to
Maryland purchasers, had refused on the ground that Maryland lacked
authority to compel it to do so. The Maryland Supreme Court sustained
the state in an action which had been brought to recover these taxes,"'
but the United States Supreme Court, by a vote of 5-4, reversed, holding
that advertising and delivering in Maryland were not sufficient contacts
within the state to require the Delaware retailer's compliance with
Maryland's requests. In dissenting, Justice Douglas, with whom the
Chief Justice and Justices Black and Clark concurred, mildly opined
otherwise. 2 The significance of this decision and its implications for tax
administration can be appreciated only when viewed in context with the
long line of decisions which it supplements.
The basic authority on which the constitutionality of the out-of-state
retailer collection device rests is Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hopkins3 There,
a local retailer had defied the mandate of an Arkansas statute'4 which
required him to collect a tax on the sale of gasoline to be used in motor
vehicles on highways of the state. His contention that the burden and
expense which collection of the tax would impose upon him contravened
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was rejected,
however, on the ground that such inconveniences were merely incidental
to a proper exercise of the state's regulatory powers.' 5 Relying pri-
marily on this case,' 6 the Supreme Court upheld the application of a
similar Iowa statute 7 to an Arizona corporation "doing business". in
Iowa in Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson,' observing somewhat gra-
tuitously that the requirement by a state that an out-of-state corporation
(i.e., tax is borne by consumer) in that the latter would discriminate against purchasers
in interstate commerce. Id. at 74.
9347 U.s. 340 (1954).
" MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 371-375 (Flack 1951).
'Miller Bros. v. State, 2o Md. 535, 95 A.zd 786 ('953).
12 347 U.S. at 357 (954).
"± .64 U.S. 137 (924).
"Aacr OF ARKANSAS 19i 1, Act. No. 6o6, at 685.
15 264 U.S. 137, 139 (-924).
"°Also cited were Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 443 (191o) (up-
holding a state statute requiring a national bank to act as a collection agent as to
taxes due the state from its shareholders), and Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 48 S.D.
482, 2o5 N.W. 72 (1925) (upholding the validity of a statute similar to the Arkansas
statute in the Monamotor case, note L8 infra).
"IOWA CODE C. 25i-Ai, § 50 9 3-Ai (x931).
8 29z U.S. 86 0934).
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collect its use tax was "a common and entirely lawful arrangement."' 0
Any lingering doubts as to the constitutionality of this tax collection
device were dispelled by Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher.2"
There, an Illinois retailer not qualified to do business in California,
had solicited orders for goods from California purchasers through
local offices maintained for that purpose. California's attempt to com-
pel the Illinois retailer to collect its use tax2' on these sales, however,
was met this time with the added contention that such an imposition
would constitute an undue burden on commerce. But the Supreme
Court, relying almost entirely on the Monamotor case, summarily
brushed this argument aside and sustained the collection device, noting
that it "imposes no unconstitutional burden either upon interstate com-
merce or upon the appellant."
22
Emboldened by these successes, legislatures, seeking to tap new
revenue sources, then sought further to extend the reach of the out-of-
state retailer collection device by requiring every retailer maintaining a
place of business within the state to collect the tax from local pur-
chasers, even where the sale had been consummated outside of the
state.2 The validity of such provisions was examined in the companion
cases of Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,24 and Nelson v. Montgomery
Ward & Co.25 There, defendants, foreign corporations maintaining
places of business in Iowa, had been subjected to the duty of tax col-
lection of mail order transactions involving orders sent by Iowa pur-
chasers to out-of-state branches of the companies, and filled by mail or
by common carrier from these branches. The defendants contended,
inter alia, that the Monamotor and Felt-Tarrant cases were distinguish-
able in that the foreign corporations there involved had been actively
engaged in a local business, whereas in the instant cases the defendants,
though they did incidentally maintain local branches, were required to
collect the use tax on transactions arising entirely independently of the
places of business in Iowa. In addition, the defendants urged the un-
fairness of saddling them with the burdensome expenses of collection,
one of which was the liability for those taxes not remitted by pur-
chasers.20 The Supreme Court rejected these and other arguments,
19 1d. at 93- 203o6 U.S. 6z (x939).
"CAL. STAT. c. 361 (935), as amended, CAL. STAT. CC. 401, 671, 683 (937).
22 306 U.S. 62, 68 (.939).
2
-See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 6943.1o2, 6943.125 (1939).
24 32 U.S. 359 (941-
2 3 P2  U.S. 373 (94 0-
20 On the basis of experience in use tax collecting in Illinois, Sears, Roebuck & Co.
introduced evidence tending to prove that the minimum loss it could expect in under-
taking to collect the Iowa use tax would amount to about $45,700 on every $oo,ooo
of use tax liability. 312 U.S. 359, 365 (.941).
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however, and affirmed the duty of the defendants to collect the use tax,
observing that, irrespective of the company branches involved in these
mail orders, Iowa might assume their relation to the defendants' outlets
within the state. As to the expense of collecting the tax, the Court
would not permit appellees to "found a constitutional right on the prac-
tical opportunities for tax avoidance which its method of doing business
affords Iowa residents .... ,2
A further extension of the out-of-state retailer collection device was
countenanced by the Supreme Court in General Trading Co. v. State
Tax Commission of Iowa18 There, the defendant, a Minnesota cor-
poration which had not qualified to do business in Iowa and maintained
no offices there, had solicited orders and made sales of goods to Iowa
purchasers through traveling salesmen sent into Iowa from the head-
quarters in Minnesota, and had delivered the goods by mail or common
carrier. In upholding the defendant's duty to collect Iowa's use tax the
Court cited the Felt-Tarrant case as an indistinguishable precedent, and
purported to follow the Sears Roebuck, Montgomery Ward, and Mona-
motor cases. It seemingly ignored the fact that in these cases the out-of-
state vendor had either qualified to do business within the taxing state,
or at least had maintained offices there; the defendant here had done
neither. Mr. Justice Jackson seized upon this distinction in a vigorous
dissent, in which he stated that "this decision, by which one may not ship
goods from anywhere in the United States to a purchaser in Iowa with-
out becoming a non-resident tax collector, exceeds everything so far
done by this court. ' 29
Concededly, the Court might have been justified in deciding sev-
eral of these cases differently. That it did not, in the face of substantial
due process and interstate commerce objections, indicates the significance
which it has attached to the preservation and extension of this collection
device. In the light of this obvious choice of policy, therefore, the
Miller Bros. decision is surprising. Despite the manifest consistency
with the past decisions, from a standpoint of policy, of the extension
sought, and despite the national significance of the question,30 a sharply
27id. at 366.
28 322 U,.s 335 (9¢4)-
"
8Id. at 339.
" This "national significance" derives in part from the fact that the decision de-
termined the invalidity of various state statutory provisions specifically recognizing
solicitation and local delivery as adequate contacts to sustain the collection device.
E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 790 (940) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. 105-223, § 805 (1950) ;
MISS. CODE ANN. § 10146-o2(10) (1942). But a broader significance appears when
the Miller Bros. case is viewed in the context of the tax scheme to which it applies. Sales
tax revenues are, in many states, so substantial as to justify partial or total abandon-
ment of the state income tax. Fairness and necessity dictate to each citizen-purchaser
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divided court was "unable to find ... a precedent for sustaining the
liability asserted by Maryland here."3 Though it had countenanced
more substantial extensions of the out-of-state retailer collection device,
the relatively mild advances beyond personal sales solicitation to solid-
tation through media was apparently more than the Court would
tolerate.
Though the distinction established by this case may seem to be
illogical and unreasonable, it is nevertheless determinative as to the
powers of tax administrators. Hereafter, with a lesser degree of activity
than solidtation by salesmen within the taxing state, the out-of-state re-
tailer collection device can be, expected to fall as violative of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
GARY S. STEIN
an obligation to pay taxes5 but such deterrents to tax avoidance as the out-of-state re-
tailer collection device are needed to enforce this obligation. The Miller Bros. decision
vitiates the use tax by immunizing therefrom purchases from out-of-state stores (many
of which typically deliver and advertise in the taxing state but rarely send salesmen
there) and thus pointedly frustrates an element of the states' tax programs. That
state tax programs should be sustained whenever possible is axiomatic. It seems incom-
prehensible, then, that the out-of-state retailer collection device, clearly an integral part
of Maryland's tax scheme, should be emasculated on the basis of the rather fine dis-
tinction between personal sales solicitation and solicitation through media.
31 347 U.s. 340, 345 (I954).
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